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1.  Introduction 
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It is a well-known fact that the material conditional familiar from classical logic 
is not a good translation of English constructions involving 'if . . .  then . . .  " even 
though it is the best truth-functional connective to serve that purpose. Work on the 
semantics of modality and counterfactual conditionals (Lewis, 1 973 ; Kratzer, 1 979) 
inspired an alternative treatment of indicative conditionals in terms of restricted 
quantification over possible worlds (Kratzer, 1 986, 1 99 1 ) . Given a conversational 
background-a contextually given set of possible worlds-the antecedent (that is, 
the denotation of the protasis) of a sentence like 
( 1 )  If you strike the match, it will light. 
restricts that set of worlds to those in which strike the match, and the con­
sequent (the denotation of the apodosis) is interpreted as a universally quantified 
statement asserting that the match lights in all of those worlds . More precisely, 
symbolizing the background as "K," we can say :  
Definition 1 A conditional 'If A then C ' is true with respect to a set of worlds K 
if and only iffor all worlds in K in which A is true, C is true. 
This paper addresses two questions left open by this approach: 
(2) a. What is the force of the quantification? 
b. What is the source of the "background" set of worlds? 
The first is motivated by the fact that if, as in Definition 1 ,  the quantification 
over the relevant set of worlds is universal, then a number problematic inference 
patterns remain unaccounted for. According to Definition 1 ,  a conditional 'If A 
then C ' is true with respect to a background set K if and only if the corresponding 
material conditional A :J C is true at all worlds in K. Thus if, for instance, K 
is taken to represent the beliefs of the speaker, then belief in the natural-language 
conditional is predicted to be belief in the material conditional . In Section 2 I use a 
number of examples to cast doubt on that, and in Section 3 I argue the merits of a 
probabilistic alternative. 
The second question concerns the origins of the set of worlds providing 
the "background" (K in Definition 1 .) It is often identified with the set of those 
worlds that are compatible with what is known by the speaker, all participants in the 
conversation, or some hypothetical agent. Kratzer ( 1 99 1 )  considers this epistemic 
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interpretation the most basic and common one, although she also mentions different 
kinds of modality (deontic etc.)  for which different sets may be relevant. 
Different epistemic states may give different values to the same conditional . 
This raises the question as to whether conditionals have objective truth values in­
dependently of anyone's beliefs, defined solely in terms of the facts of the world. 
If they do, question (2b) must be addressed in addition to (2a) . If they do not, 
then conditionals can only be treated as statements about beliefs and it is not clear 
whether the belief in a conditional is the belief that it is true. 
Section 4 relates both the origins of the set of worlds and the probabilistic 
alternative to universal quantification to a theory of objective chance. Finally, Sec­
tion 5 suggests further refinements of the account, drawing on intuitive connections 
between conditional predictions and counterfactual conditionals .  
This paper is mainly concerned with the values of predictive conditionals, 
illustrated in (3a) .  Epistemic conditionals like (3b) are beyond its scope, and coun­
terfactuals such as (3c) are only briefly touched upon. For a more comprehensive 
account, see Kaufmann (200 1 ) . 
(3) a. If you strike the match, it will light. 
b. If you struck the match, it lit. 
c. If you had struck the match, it would have lit. 
2. Data: Inference patterns 
[predictive] 
[epistemic] 
[ counterfactual] 
In this section I review some inference patterns which demonstrate that the ma­
terial conditional is not an appropriate connective to model our everyday use of 
conditionals . 1 As shown in Section 1 ,  this inadequacy of the material conditional 
carries over to an account in terms of universal quantification over worlds. 
Each of the following four subsections will start with a valid inference pat­
tern involving the material conditional , then present a linguistic example to show 
that the same pattern is not valid with the "natural" conditional . 
2 . 1 .  Strengthening the antecedent 
(4) A :)  C 
AB :) C 
However: Far from contradicting (5a), (5b) is a perfectly natural continua­
tion. Thus the two sentences in (5c) are consistent. 
(5) a. "If I install a better alarm system," Griliches said, "that is an improve­
ment in the quality of my life, and therefore a decline in inflation. 
b. But if the burglars learn how to trick this alarm system, that is a rise in 
price, because the quality advantage will be eroded. [ nyt 9 6 1 2 1 7 . 0 4 7 4 ] 
c.  A -+ C and AB -+ C. 
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2.2. Contraposition 
(6) A ::J  C 
C ::J A  
However: (7a) may be true while (7b) is false . One may assent to the former 
while rejecting the latter. 
(7) a. If you're a high achiever, it takes a long time to get recognition." 
[ nyt 9 6 1 1 3 0 . 0 1 2 8 ]  
b. ??If it takes a short time to get recognition, you're a low achiever. 
c. A -+ C. But not C -+ A. 
2.3 .  Vacuous truth 
(8) A 
-A--:--::J----::::C,-
However: The truth of (9a) does not ensure the truth of (9b) . 
(9) a. The flood crest won't  reach the levels projected. 
b. ??If the flood crest reaches the level projected, much of the city will be 
under water. 
c. A. But not A -+ C. 
2.4. Hypothetical Syllogism 
( 1 0) B ::J C 
A ::J B  
A ::J C  
However: It is possible to assent to both of ( l l a,b), yet reject ( I  I c) .  
( I I )  a. If I quit my job, I can't afford my apartment. 
b. If I win a Million, I'll quit my job. 
c. ??If I win a Million, I can't  afford my apartment. 
d. B -+ C and A -+ B. But not A -+ C 
It has been pointed out (Adams, 1 975 ; Kratzer, 1986, and elsewhere) that 
counterexamples to Transitivity typically rely on changes in the conversational 
background and premises which would not in fact be tenable simultaneously with 
respect to the same background. In ( 1 1 ) , too, this can be exposed by changing 
the order of the premises : ( l 2a,b) together are much less plausible than ( l l a,b), a 
fact which is attributable to the tendency to interpret ( l 2b) as the modally subordi­
nated ( l 2c). 
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( 1 2) a. If I win a Million, I ' l l  quit my job. 
b. ??If I quit my job, I can't  afford my apartment. 
c .  ??If I win a Million and quit my job, I can't  afford my apartment. 
( 1 3) A -+ B 
AB -+ C  
A -+ C  
This is in line with the more general fact that the inference illustrated in ( 1 3) 
does indeed seem valid. This, too, needs to be explained. 
3. Probability 
The account I am going to propose is a probabilistic one. This section introduces 
some relevant notions and motivations, as well as a first step towards a formal im­
plementation. 
3 . 1 .  What is probability? 
Like truth values, probabilities are numbers attached to propositions and, by exten­
sion, to sentences .  Unlike truth values, probabilities can be intermediate, between 
o and 1 (inclusive.)  What it means for such a value to be short of 1 depends on 
what it would mean for it to be 1 :  If " I "  means "true," then a value short of 1 
signifies an objective chance. If " 1 "  means "known," a value short of 1 signifies 
a degree of (subjective) credence or epistemic support. Both of these interpreta­
tions are related-subjective credence can be thought of as an estimate of objective 
chance-and both follow the same probabilistic calculus. Here I focus on the ob­
jective values of conditionals .  
The probabilistic calculus defines the values of propositions and compounds 
thereof. In addition, it defines, for each pair of propositions X and Y, the condi­
tional probability of Y, given X, whenever the probability of X is positive. This 
can be paraphrased as "the probability Y will (would) have if X is (were) the case." 
3 .2 .  Why probability ? 
Many authors have been intrigued by the parallelism between the informal char­
acterization of conditional probability and the natural-language conditional . Com­
pare ( 14a,b) : 
( 1 4) The value of 'If A then C '  is that of . . .  
a. 'Either A is false or C is true, or both . '  
b. 'C is true, assuming / given / provided that A is true. ' 
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To many, ( 1 4b) just "sounds right." Van Fraassen ( 1 976) made one of the 
many statements to this effect: 
[T]he English statement of a conditional probability sounds ex­
actly like that of the probability of a conditional . What is the proba­
bility that I throw a six if I throw an even number, if not the proba­
bility that: if I throw an even number, it will be a six? (pp. 272-3) 
Besides this "gut feeling," however, there are powerful theoretical argu­
ments in favor of the probabilistic account. Adams ( 1 965, 1 975,  1 998) explored 
its consequences in a theory of probabilistic inference, central to which are the fol­
lowing two assumptions :  
( 1 5) a. The probability of a conditional 'If A then C '  is the conditional proba­
bility of C, given A; and 
b. Inference preserves (high) probability : An inference pattern is proba­
bilistically valid if and only if it is impossible for the premises to be 
highly likely while the conclusion is not highly likely.2 
The resulting system of inference has several desirable properties ; the two 
most relevant in the present context are the following: 
( 1 6) a. All probabilistically valid inferences are classically valid. 
b. Some classically valid inferences are not probabilistically valid: Strength­
ening the antecedent, Contraposition, Vacuous truth, Transitivity. 
In addition, while Transitivity is invalid, the variant involving modal subor­
dination, illustrated in ( 1 2), is valid, as desired. 
Aside from other advantages, these properties-its conservativity with re­
spect to the classically valid inferences and its predictions as to which inferences 
involving conditionals are invalid-strongly recommend a probabilistic semantics 
as a superior model of the way we actually use and reason with conditionals. But 
can it be integrated with the familiar possible-worlds semantics? 
3.3 .  Probabilities o/propositions 
The primary use of probabilities is in modeling uncertainty. Uncertainty in tum is 
modeled by spelling out all the possibilities-possible worlds in the familiar sense. 
Let W be such a set of worlds . A probability distribution is a function Pr from 
subsets of W to real numbers, satisfying the conditions in Figure 1 .3 
For all subsets X of W, Pr (X) is the probability that the actual world is in 
X. Thus Pr (W) is merely the probability that we are in a world. The third condi­
tion ensures, roughly speaking, that "the larger the set, the larger the probability." 
The conditional probability Pr(Y IX) of Y, given X, is the amount of Y-worlds 
among the X -worlds, as shown in Figure 2. 
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Pr{W) = 1 
o � Pr{X) � 1 for X � W 
Pr {X U Y) = Pr {X) + Pr{Y) 
if X and Y are disjoint 
Figure 1 :  Probability 
Pr (3) 
Pr {Y\X) = 
Pr (2) + Pr(3) 
but undefined if X is empty 
Figure 2: Conditional probability 
Thus the definition of conditional probabilities captures the same intuition 
that is behind the treatment of conditionals in terms of restricted quantification. 
The difference is that conditional probability admits of degrees: Whereas anything 
short of " 1 "  is "false" on the logical account, a high conditional probability may 
still render a sentence "true enough." 
3 .4 .  Probabilities of sentences 
The function Pr is defined over sets of worlds. At issue here, however, are the val­
ues of sentences. Atomic sentences receive their truth values at individual worlds 
with reference to the facts at those worlds. A valuation function V is defined for 
all pairs of atomic sentences and worlds, and extended to all truth-functional com­
pounds of sentences not containing conditionals, as follows: 
( 1 7) 
( 1 8) 
( 1 9) 
V(A) (w) E {O , 1 } 
V{cp) (w) = 1 - V{cp) (w) 
V(cp A 1j;) (w) = V{cp) (w) . V {1j;) (w) 
Based on V and Pr, we now define a measure P on sentences : P(A) is the 
expectation, or weighted average, of the values of V (A) , where the weights are the 
probabilities, for each value x in the range of V(A) , that V(A) assigns x. I will 
abbreviate expressions of the form "{w E W \ V{cp) {w) = x}" as "{V{cp) = x} ." 
Then4 
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P(A) =df E[V(A) ] = x · Pr ( {V(A) = x} )  
xErange(V(A» 
= 1 ·  Pr ( {V(A) = I } )  + O · Pr ( {V(A) = O} )  
= Pr ({V(A) = I } )  
Thus P(A) , the value of A under Pr  and V,  i s  just the probability that 
A is true. As in the case of V, this extends straightforwardly to truth-functional 
compounds of atomic sentences. We can now also define conditional values of 
sentences in terms of conditional expectations: 
(2 1 )  P(C IA) =df E[V(C) I {V(A) = I }] 
L X ' Pr( {V(C) = x} I {V (A) = I } )  
xErange(V( e» 
= Pr({V(C) = l } I {V (A) = I } )  
Given the overall goal of relating the probabilities of conditionals t o  their 
truth values on the one hand and to conditional probabilities on the other, the task 
now is to define V(A � C) in such a way that P(A � C) equals P(C IA) regard­
less of Pro 
3 .5 .  Probabilities of conditionals 
So far the values of conditionals at individual worlds are not defined. What should 
V(A � C) (w) be? 
This question has been at the center of considerable debate in the philosoph­
ical literature. What would appear to be the most straightforward definition is not 
available: It is not generally possible to distinguish, once and for all ,  the worlds at 
which the conditional is true from those at which it isfalse. The following is merely 
an indication of one aspect of the problem; there is no room here to discuss it in full 
detail . 
There are no "conditional propositions," in the following sense : For two 
propositions X and Y, there is no proposition Z (except for certain pathological 
cases) such that the equality Pr (Z) = Pr (Y IX) is guaranteed for all Pr under 
which both are defined. Intuitively, this is because Pr(Y IX) depends only on 
Pr(X) and Pr(XY) while the Z we seek to identify must be allowed to include 
worlds outside X. To ensure the equivalence of Pr (Z) and Pr (Y I X) , there must be 
worlds outside X that are in Z when Pr (Y IX) is large and not in Z when Pr(Y I X) 
is small . But then membership in Z cannot be determined once and for all ,  hence Z 
is not a proposition. Consequently, a definition identifying {V(A � C) = I }  with 
Z is not forthcoming. 
The triviality results of Lewis ( 1 976, 1 986b) show that one apparently plau­
sible way of addressing the issue-by stipulating that the truth or falsehood of the 
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consequent is sufficient for the truth or falsehood, respectively, of the conditional­
is not viable. Despite the importance of these results in the history of the field, I 
will not say more about them here. The approach presented below is not vulnerable 
to them.5 
4. The values of conditionals 
The account I present here has precursors in the work of van Fraassen ( 1 976) 
and Jeffrey ( 1 99 1 ) . The common idea is to assign intermediate values, between 
o and 1 ,  to conditionals at worlds.6 The advantages of my treatment that I want to 
deal with in some detail are (i) its metaphysical foundation, relating the values to 
objective chances and thus to the facts at the world of evaluation; and (ii) the values 
predicted for complex conditionals, discussed in Section 5 .  
4. 1 .  Intermediate values 
The definition distinguishes between those worlds at which the antecedent is true 
and those at which it is false. At the former, the values coincide with those of the 
material conditional : 
(22) V(A --t C) (w) = V (C) (w) if V(A) (w) = 1 
This defines values for all worlds at which the antecedent is true. (23) is the 
conditional expectation of V (A --t C) over the set of those worlds : 
(23) E[V(A --t C) I {V(A) = I }] = E[V (C) I {V(A) = I }] 
= Pr ({V(C) = I } I {V (A) = I } )  
The idea i s  to let this conditional expectation be the value assigned by 
V(A --t C) at those worlds where the antecedent is false : 
{ V(C) (w) if V(A) (w) = 1 (24) V(A --t C) (w) = E [V(A --t C) I {V(A) = I }] if V(A) (w) = 0 
Now with V(A --t C) defined everywhere, the desired equality of the prob­
ability of the conditional with the conditional probability follows as shown in (25) .  
(25) P(A --t C) = E[V (A --t C)] 
=E[V(A --t C) I {V(A) = I }] · (Pr ( {V(A) = I } )  + Pr( {V(A) = O} ) ) 
=Pr ({V(C) = I } I {V(A) = I } )  
=P(C IA) 
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So far, so good. What remains to be seen is whether this "rather weird 
three-valued entity" (Edgington, 1 995) deserves to be credited with any explana­
tory value. As it stands, it appears to be little more than technical "hack" whose 
utility as a theory of conditionals is rather questionable. In particular, it invites two 
objections: Firstly, as it is defined, V is really a function of three arguments : A sen­
tence, a world, and the probability distribution Pr. The value at one and the same 
world will change if the probability distribution changes. In what sense, then, is that 
value "objective"? Secondly, what does it mean for values at individual worlds-in 
the absence of any uncertainty about the facts-to be intermediate? Why should 
it be sensible to assign such values? I will address these points in the following 
section. 
4.2. Time, truth, and chance 
At worlds at which the antecedent is false, the value of a conditional depends on 
the probability distribution Pr. Does this amount to abandoning the notion that the 
value is objective, i .e . ,  that it only depends on the facts at the world of evaluation? 
Not if the distribution Pr itself only depends on the facts at that world. It may 
not be immediately clear how that should be, however, for probabilities arise under 
uncertainty, but a fully specified world admits of no uncertainty. 
The key to reconciling these apparently contradictory notions is the fact that 
at the time the conditional is evaluated, the world is not yet fully specified--only 
an initial segment of its history is .  This initial segment also determines the set of 
its possible continuations and their respective probabilities : the (objective) chance 
that the actual continuation is of one kind rather than another. 
Objective chances manifest themselves in the distribution of facts . Put sim­
ply, chances are the predictions made by a good stochastic model which fits the 
stream of facts well. More can be said about the goodness of a model and the 
goodness of its fit, but that is not a linguistic problem. For discussions, see for 
instance Ramsey ( 1 929) ; Lewis ( 1 980, 1 994) ; Grunwald ( 1 998) .  
A model in which the evolution of chance over time can be encoded must 
add a temporal dimension to the set of worlds . The Venn diagrams in Section 3 .3  
depict worlds as points. If we "pull them out of the page and lay them on the side," 
they look like Figure 3 .  Models of this kind have been dubbed "T x W -frames" 
by Thomason ( 1 984). Definition 2 is his. 
Definition 2 (T x W -frames (Thomason, 1984» A T x W frame is a quadruple 
(w, T, < , � ) , where 0. ) W and T are nonempty sets, (U. ) < is a transitive relation 
on T which is also irreflexive and linear (i. e. t <j. t for all t E T, and either t < t' 
or t' < t or t  = t' for all t, t' E T), and (iii. ) � is a 3-place relation on T x W x W, 
such that 
a. for all t, �t is an equivalence relation (i. e. W �t W for all t E T and W E W, 
etc. ), and 
b. for all WI , W2 E W and t, t' E T, if WI �t W2 and t' < t, then WI �t' W2. 
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wl�------�-------------r-------------------
w2 
�L-------�----+--------r-------------------
t" Time 
Figure 3 :  A T x W-model . 
The conditions imposed by Definition 2 enable the model to encode some 
fundamental intuitions about time. (ii . )  requires that points in time be ordered as 
shown in Figure 3 .  The purpose of the �-relation in (iii . )  is to define the "historical 
alternatives" to a given world w at a time t as those worlds which agree with w at 
all past times through t but may differ in the future. This accounts for the intuition 
that different futures can grow out of identical (or in any case, indistinguishable) 
pasts. 
Our world evolves through time by shedding alternative courses of history. 
At each time, exactly one of the states it could have been in is the one it actually 
is in. Furthermore, at each time, past and present are fixed: Although they could 
have been otherwise, they cannot (any longer) have been otherwise. This is known 
as historical necessity. 
It will be helpful the reify the sets of worlds which agree with the actual 
course of history up to some given time. 
Definition 3 (Histories in T x W-frames) Let [w ] t = {w' E W lw �t w'} be the 
set of historical alternatives of w at t. A history is a function h : T I---t p (W) such 
thatfor some world w E W, h(t) = [w] t at all t E T. 
Clause (iiib.) on the �-relation imposes a monotonicity condition on his­
tories : Each h(t) is a subset of h(t' ) for all t' < t. Thus it is impossible for two 
worlds to "become" historical alternatives at some point. Nor is it possible for two 
historical alternatives "not to have been" historical alternatives at earlier times. 
Next, the assignment function V is made sensitive to time. Let A bet he set 
of atomic sentences in the language. 
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Definition 4 (T x W interpretation) A valuation function is a function V : A x 
T x W H {O , 1 } from atomic sentences and time-world pairs to truth values, 
provided that for all atomic sentences A E A, if W �t w', then V ( rp) (t) ( w) = 
V( rp ) (t) (  w') . 
This extends to truth-conditional compounds straightforwardly, as before. 
Definition 4 ensures that the worlds belonging to the "slice" h(t) of history h at time 
t agree on all facts at all times leading up to t. In Figure 3, this is visualized by the 
black rectangles: Worlds that are enclosed by a black rectangle are indistinguishable 
at all times covered by the black area. 
Finally, in dealing with predictions, a means of representing and evaluating 
assertions about the future is indispensable. In addition to the quantifiers P and 
F familiar from Prior's ( 1 967) tense logic (and their duals H and G,) it is also 
convenient to have expressions of the form rpt with a temporal index, paraphrase­
able as 'rp was / is / will be true at time t ' . The valuation function is extended as 
expected: 
(26) V(rpt' ) (t) (w) = V(rp) (t') (w) 
(27) V(P ) (t) (w) = { 1 if for s�me t' s.t .  t' < t, V(rp) (t' ) (w) = 1 rp 0 otherwIse 
(28) V (F ) (t) (w) = { 1 if for s�me --t' s.t . t < t' , V (rp) (t' ) (w) = 1 rp 0 otherwIse 
Definition 4 combined with this extension to tensed sentences implies that 
all worlds belonging to a "slice" h(t) of history agree not only on the truth values 
of all sentences at all times leading up to t, but also on the the truth values of all 
sentences about times up to t. No such requirement follows for statements about 
times later than t, however. 
This leads to the last notion to be introduced here, and the one most rele­
vant in the present context: The truth of a sentence is settled in a history h at a 
time t whenever it is impossible, relative to the set h(t) , for it to be false. Again 
following Prior ( 1 967), I define the operator L; Lrp stands for 'rp is settled. ' 
(29) V(L ) (t) (w) = { 1 if for a�l w' E h(t) , V (rp) (t) (w') = 1 rp 0 otherwIse 
The distinction between truth and settledness is important and bears some 
potential for confusion. The two are equivalent for statements not about the future: 
Whatever is true about past and present is also settled. The future, in contrast, is 
open: Statements about it may be true without being settled. It is possible to make 
true predictions without any way of knowing (already) that they are true. 
Our readiness to assert or assent to predictions is guided by the settledness, 
so that the intended notion of truth requires some getting used to. We are most con­
fident in those predictions whose truth is established. However, even unlikely pre­
dictions are true as long as they "tum out" true in due course. Consider a sentence 
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cpt' at time t, where t < t' . As time progresses beyond t' and continuations that were 
possible at t are eliminated, only those worlds w survive for which V ( cpt' ) (  t) ( w ) 
was I or 0, as the case may be, already. The truth value of cpt' at t is established 
"retroactively," but its truth does not imply settledness .  Thus simple predictions 
like (30) have truth values at all worlds . 
(30) You will strike the match. 
It is important to emphasize here the difference between sentences like (30) 
and conditionals, which as I claimed above do not always have truth values .  This 
claim does not mean that their truth is merely not settled in the way the truth of 
simple predictions is not settled. Rather, it means that they differ more fundamen­
tally from simple predictions like (30) in that at some worlds their truth cannot be 
established at all .  
The final step is the re-introduction of probability, now interpreted as objec­
tive chance. In Section 3 .3 ,  Pr was defined over a set of timeless worlds, modeled 
as points. Now the points are stretched out into world-lines, but no additional ap­
paratus is needed to model the evolution of chance over time. Pr is the objective 
prior distribution over the possible courses of history. This is an idealization from a 
metaphysical point of view-one may not believe that chance exists in the absence 
of facts-but one we are free to make in building the model . As time progresses and 
the facts "come in," the set of worlds among which ours must be becomes smaller, 
and the probability mass is accordingly concentrated on ever smaller subsets of W. 
New distributions Prh,t derive from Pr by conditioning on the totality of  settled 
facts embodied by h(t) . 
Definition 5 (Probability in history) Given a T x W -frame and a probability dis­
tribution Pr over W, the distribution Prh,t in history h at time t is defined as 
follows: For all propositions X, Prh ,t (X) = Pr (X l h(t) ) . 
Definition 5 makes a connection between settledness and chance and popu­
lates the space between 0 and 1 with intermediate degrees.  The settledness of past 
and present facts corresponds to extreme chances : The chance that the match lit is 
1 if it did, 0 if it did not. The chance that the match will light, on the other hand, 
is intermediate unless its lighting is either inevitable or impossible . Probabilities of 
sentences at times are obtained as before via V and Pr, as expectations conditional 
upon the history h to t :  
(3 1 )  
(*) 
pt (cpt' ) = E[V(cpt' ) (t) l h(t) ] = E[V(cp) (t') l h (t) ] 
= Pr ( {V(cp) (t') = l } l h (t) )  
If cp i s  atomic or truth-functional, the value comes down to ( * ) ;  conditionals, 
however, receive intermediate values where their antecedents are false, as outlined 
in Section 3 .5 .  
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The first potential objection to the intermediate-value approach is now ad­
dressed: The probability distribution with respect to which the intermediate values 
at worlds are calculated, interpreted as objective chance, is fully determined by the 
facts at the world and time of evaluation (recall that all worlds in h(t) are indistin­
guishable with respect to their past.) 
The second potential objection concerned the very idea of assigning inter­
mediate values to conditionals at worlds . Truth values are defined by truth condi­
tions with reference to facts. Simple predictions about the future depend for their 
truth values on future facts . Are not the truth values of conditionals established 
"retroactively" as well? Consider (32a), uttered at some time, say 9a.m., about your 
behavior over the next couple of minutes. 
(32) a. If you strike the match, it will light. 
b. You will strike the match. 
To avoid the potentially confusing talk of "truth," it may be safer to speak 
of the verifying and falsifying instances among the worlds in h(t) . What future 
facts reveal about the simple prediction in (32b) is not whether it was settled, but 
whether it turns out true-that is, whether the actual world is one of the verifying 
cases. Likewise for (32a) .  What do future facts at a later time, say 1 0a.m. ,  reveal 
about (32a)? 
Those worlds in which you do in fact strike the match are easy to classify :  
Where i t  lights, (32a) is verified; where i t  doesn't, (32a) is falsified. Things are 
much less clear where you don't strike the match. Whether it lights (for some 
other reason) or not has no bearing on the truth of the conditional . Classical logic 
stipulates counterintuitively that your not striking the match is sufficient for the 
truth of (32a) . It would be no more intuitive to stipulate that (32a) is false at those 
worlds . Nor should its value be undefined: Your not striking the match is does not 
mean that we know less about it then before. Indeed, (32a) is just "as true" as it 
was when it was used. This intuition is captured in the assignment of intermediate 
values at worlds where the antecedent is false. 
4 .3 .  Other conditionals 
Although this paper is mainly concerned with the objective values of predictive 
conditionals, a brief remark on the values of other conditionals is in order. Com­
pare (33a), used at l Oa.m. , when the facts are settled, with (32a) . 
(33) a. If you struck the match, it lit. 
b. If you had struck the match, it would have lit. 
The facts relevant to the truth of (33a) are settled; there is no objective un­
certainty. At worlds at which you did not strike the match, it is impossible for you 
to have struck it. The objective value of (33a) at 10a.m. is undefined. Accordingly, 
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the use of (33a) by a speaker who knows that you did not strike the match is infe­
licitous. However, (33a) may be used felicitously by a speaker who is ignorant of 
the relevant facts .7 
Thus the values of (33a) at 1 0a.m. and (32a) at 9a.m. are quite different. 
Not so with (33b) : Intuitively, its value at 1 0a.m. should be the same as that of (32a) 
at 9a.m. This intuition is on the right track, although it needs to be refined in ways 
that need not concern us here (cf. Kaufmann (200 1 ) .) The connection between 
predictions and counterfactuals is helpful in the next section, however. 
5. Right-nested conditionals 
The assignment function V as defined above extends without further modification 
to conditionals whose apodosis is itself a conditional . It turns out, however, that 
the values predicted for such complex conditionals are counterintuitive . In this  last 
section I am going to discuss one example of this kind to motivate an amendment 
to the truth definitions. There is not enough room to discuss more embedded con­
ditionals and compounds thereof. Instead, the discussion is intended to illustrate 
the connection between predictions and counterfactuals in some more detail .  In the 
interest of readability I will return to the simpler definition of V without reference 
to time. 
5 . 1 .  Wrong predictions 
Consider the right-nested conditional in (34a), symbolized as (34b) . 
(34) a. If the match is wet, then if you strike it, it will light. 
b. W -+ (S -+ L) 
To test the predictions, suppose the circumstances are as summarized in (35) .  
Intuitions are not generally as clear-cut as the customary use of real numbers would 
suggest. Accordingly, the numbers in (35) are merely intended as formal stand-ins 
for rough estimates such as "high," "low," etc . 
(35) a. Whether you strike the match is independent of whether it is wet. 
b. The probability that . . .  
- it gets wet is "low" ( .2) 
- you strike it is .5 
- it lights if it is dry and you strike it is "high" ( .8) 
- it lights if it is wet and you strike it is "tiny" ( .0 1 )  
From (35) it follows that P(L I S) , the probability that it lights given that you 
strike it, is P(L I SW)P(W IS) + P(L I SW)P(W I S) = . 01 · .2 + . 8  . . 8 = . 642 .  
Figure 4a displays the distribution of values of the consequent S -+ L of 
(34.) It is 1 (black) where both S and L are true, 0 (white) where S is true and L is 
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Figure 4 :  Distribution of  values for (34) 
false, and intermediate (grey) where S is false. The relative sizes of the areas in the 
figure roughly correspond to the probabilities given in (35) .  
Intuitively in a situation like this, the probability of (34) should be "tiny." 
That is not, however, what the definitions predict. The assignment of values of (34) 
is defined as in (36). 
(36) V(W � (S � L) ) (w) 
_ { V(S � L) (w) if V (W) (w) = 1 -
E[V(W � (S � L) ) I {V(W) = I } ]  if V (W) (w) = 0 
where the values of V (S � L) are 
(37) V(S � L) (w) 
{ V(L) (w) if V(S) (w) = 1 -
E[V(S � L) I {V(S) = I }]  if V(S) (w) = 0 
To calculate P(W � (S � L) ) , the expectation of the values of (36), we 
first consider the values at those worlds where its antecedent is true, i .e . ,  where the 
match is wet. In Figure 4 this corresponds to the two quadrants on the left. At all 
those worlds, the value of the consequent is assigned as the value of the conditional . 
(38) P(S � L IW) =E[V(S � L) I {V(W) = I }]  
=1 · Pr ( {V(S) = V (L) = 1 } I {V(W) = I } ) 
+ 0 . Pr( {V(S) = 1 ,  V(L) = O} I {V(W) = I } ) 
+ . 8 1 . Pr ( {V(S) = O} I {V(W) = I } ) 
=1 . . 01 + . 642 . . 5 
= . 331 
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Again following the overall strategy, this expectation of the conditional 
given that its antecedent is true (i .e . ,  that the match is wet) is spread uniformly 
over those worlds where it is false (where the match is dry.) This distribution is 
illustrated in Figure 4b. As a result, the overall probability P( W  -t (8 -t L) ) is 
.33 1 as well .  But this is certainly not the "tiny" probability expected in the given 
scenario. 
5 .2. Fixing the rule 
What went wrong in the preceding example? The connection between the values 
of predictive conditionals and counterfactuals, pointed out above, is particularly 
helpful here. It is possible to have intuitions about the source of the problem, and 
those intuitions suggest a fairly straightforward repair. 
Suppose we inhabit a world w in which you did not strike the match. Recall 
that facts like this determine the value (39a) had at w at some earlier time. What 
was that value? 
(39) a. If you strike the match, it will light. 
b. If you had struck the match, it would have lit. 
There is no clear answer to this question. We have not been told enough 
about w: The chance depends on a "third fact," viz. whether the match is wet or not, 
in much the same way as the value of (39b) does. 
In section 4.2 I argued that the values of conditionals at worlds at which 
their antecedents are false are the objective chances of the consequent, given that 
the antecedent is true. Objective chance varies depending on many factors . The 
condition of the match affects the value of the conditional . The relation of "af­
fecting the chance of' is typically part of the definition of causal dependencies 
(cf. Davis ( 1 988) for an overview.) Without complicating the formalism with fur­
ther technicalities, we may just note two relevant facts about the scenario: 
1 .  Whether the match lights causally depends on both whether it is wet and 
whether you strike it. 
2. Whether you strike the match and whether it is wet are causally independent. 
Informally, the import of these causal dependencies is the following: Given 
the past facts up to the time in question, the process that brought it about that you 
did not strike the match is independent of the process that brought about the wetness 
of the match. Therefore at a world where the match is wet and you did not strike it, 
the chance that it would have lit if you had struck it is the chance that it would have 
done so given that it is wet. 8 
Thus although the counterintuitive predictions of the definitions above are 
only revealed in complex sentences such as (34), their source lies in the assignments 
to simple conditionals. In Figure 4a, the values of V(8 -t L) are uniform on the 
set of worlds at which the match is not struck. This is, in fact, made explicit, though 
not explained, by Jeffrey ( 1 99 1 ) : 
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Figure 5 :  Distribution of values for (34) accounting for causal relations 
" . . .  if A � C is to be an indicative conditional it must have 
the same value at all worlds where A is false." (p. 1 72) 
It is not clear why this should be so, and examples like (34) suggest that it 
is wrong. Figure 5a shows an alternative assignment, accounting for causal depen­
dencies : The values assigned at the worlds where the match is not struck are not 
uniform, but vary depending on the condition of the match. Formally, this assign­
ment is defined as in (40) . 
(40) V(A � C) (w) = 
{ V ( C) ( w) if V (A) ( w) = 1 
E [V(A � C) I {V('Pi ) = V('Pi ) (W) } ]  if V (A) (w) = 0 
for all non-descendants Xi of A in the causal order. 
The probabilistic value of (34) then is indeed the "tiny" value that was ex­
pected, given the scenario. (4 1 )  derives its expectation given that the match is wet; 
according to the rule, that value is then assigned to all worlds at which the match is 
not wet, as shown in Figure 5b. Hence the overall expectation is "tiny" indeed: 
(4 1 )  P(W � (8 � L) I {V (W) = I } ) 
= 1 · Pr ( {V(8) = V(L) = 1 } I {V (W) = I } ) 
+ O · Pr ( {V(8) = 1 ,  V (L) = O} I {V(W) = I } ) 
+ E[V(8 � L) I {V(8) = V(W) = I } ]  
. Pr ( {V(8) = O} I {V(W) = I } ) 
= _ 005 + . 01 . . 5 
= _ 01 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper discussed the objective values of predictive conditionals .  Taking those 
values to correspond to "degrees of truth," a pragmatic question arises : When is a 
sentence, conditional or otherwise, "true enough" to be used in inference or con­
versation? The probabilistic explanation of the patterns in Section 2 rests on the 
assumption that premises whose probability is short of 1 are admissible as long as 
their probabilities are "close enough" to 1 .  How close is close enough? 
I believe that no definitive answer can be given to this .  However, the lack 
of a clear cut-off point need not be thought of as a deficiency and can be explained 
away in much the same way as is done in the treatment of vagueness: by assuming, 
at least for the sake of argument, that in each context of use an implicit param­
eter is given which decides how true is "true enough." In Adams ' definition of 
probabilistic entailment (Endnote 2) this role is played by the variable f :  Roughly 
speaking, an inference is valid if its consequence can be made "true enough" under 
any interpretation of "true enough." 
A probabilistic semantics promises to be useful on three levels: Assuming, 
as I do, that contemporary science is right and the processes governing the world 
are truly non-deterministic, the objective values of predictive conditionals are as 
discussed above. Short of such metaphysical commitments, even if the world is 
deterministic, the fact remains that we talk "as if" it were not; otherwise coin tosses 
and other phenomena would not make for such convincing illustrations of random 
processes. And it is the way we talk that is at issue here. Finally, even if predictions 
could in principle be made with certainty, a theory of language interpretation which 
accommodates the fact that we cannot and need not perform such ca1culations-one 
of approximate inference-is still desirable. 
Uncertainty arises in language use in a number of ways, only two of which 
are ignorance and physical non-determinism. Other sources, such as vagueness, 
lexical and syntactic ambiguity, are instances of linguistic uncertainty with seman­
tic consequences. A large array of topics related to the one of this paper, such as 
the relationship between uncertainty about word denotations and uncertainty about 
sentence denotations, are only beginning to emerge. 
Endnotes 
* I would like Stanley Peters, Cleo Condoravdi, David Beaver, Peter Sells, 
and the audience at the Linguistics Colloquium at Northwestern University for com­
ments on various aspects of the present work. Credit is theirs, mistakes are mine. 
1 .  Throughout this paper I follow the following notational conventions:  The 
material conditional is symbolized by ' -:J ,' negation by a horizontal bar; thus A -:J 
C = A V C. The "natural" conditional corresponding to English 'If . . . then . . .  
, is referred to by ' --+ .' Linguistic examples with labels of the form [ nyt - . - ]  are 
attested in the New York Times corpus ;  the numbers refer to their location in the 
corpus. 
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2. More precisely, Adams' definition of "p-validity" is as follows :  "A sentence 
r.p follows from a set of sentences r if and only if for all f > 0 there is a 6 > 0 such 
that for all conditional probability functions Pr such that Pr(B) 2: 1 - 6 for all 
B E r, Pr(r.p) 2: 1 - c" 
3 .  The third condition must in general hold for countable unions .  This com-
plication is irrelevant as long as we deal with (finite sets of) finite sentences. 
4. In general, integrals would replace the sums. 
5 .  Kaufmann (200 1 )  discusses Lewis' triviality results in  some more detail .  
6. In statistical jargon, the function V(A ---+ C) denoted by a conditional is a 
random variable. The two-valued function V(A) denoted by an atomic sentence A 
is an indicator function. The latter are special cases of the former. 
7 .  Ignorance of settled facts can be modeled as a subjective distribution over 
mUltiple possible histories (ways of "filling in the blanks") only one of which can be 
the actual one. Subjective probabilities are estimates of the corresponding objective 
chances. A speaker may entertain the possibility that a conditional probability is 
defined when in fact it is not. 
8. Technically, causal dependencies of the kind discussed here form a strict 
partial order on the facts of the world, in which the wetness of the match is not a 
descendant of the striking. All non-descendants of the antecedent are "held con­
stant" when examining alternative worlds in which the antecedent is true. This is  
closely related to the treatment of "structural counterfactuals" by Pearl (2000) . 
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